

DIPLOMACY AND THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE

A REPORT ON THE VIEWS
OF LEADING CITIZENS
IN TWENTY-FIVE CITIES

Edited by
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The Council on Foreign Relations is a non-profit institution devoted to study of the international aspects of American political, economic and strategic problems. It takes no stand, expressed or implied, on American policy.

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FOREWORD

This survey of opinion on our policy toward the Soviet Union and Communist China, and on our relations with our allies, appears most opportunely. For officers of our State Department and of the foreign offices of Great Britain, France and other nations, will soon be meeting in Geneva with Russian and Communist Chinese representatives. Our diplomatic officers much more than their opposite numbers across the conference table will be conscious of responsibilities to an unseen audience. They will be aware that the American public is looking over their shoulders. In closed sessions they may temporarily escape this surveillance but they know that American opinion will hold them to account. Thus they operate within an area of maneuver bounded by the insights and the misunderstandings, the hopes and fears, the prejudices and the sympathies, of the people back home.

A careful reading of this survey will throw much light on what a cross-section of influential citizens in twenty-five cities thinks about issues dividing the free and communist worlds. Without anticipating any of the findings in Mr. Barber's excellent summary, I would like to point out one general feature of the replies which seems significant:

The answers of the businessmen, lawyers, educators, editors, and other citizens who took the time to ponder the Council's seventeen questions, showed overwhelming approval of the government's present policy toward the Soviet Union and strong support for its policy toward Communist China. Regarding relations with our allies, there was much more division of opinion and considerable dissatisfaction. For example, only 61% of the respondents -- not an impressive majority -- thought that the United States is measuring up to the responsibilities of leadership in the coalition of free nations.

To find out what Americans really think about specific aspects of foreign policy is a difficult task. It is much more difficult to find out why they think as they do. This survey helps us to understand motivation as well as attitudes. For example, most of those who opposed the admission of Communist China to the United Nations based their arguments upon moral principles. Moral indignation was also strongly evident among those who rejected the idea raised in Question 17 that the United States make a deal with the U.S.S.R. for the division of Europe into spheres of influence.

But elsewhere in the survey one finds that expediency dictated answers. For example, the moral issue was seldom mentioned in answers to questions on East-West trade. The discussion here was concentrated upon advantage or disadvantage to the United States. Elsewhere, in replies to other questions, there is evidence of a practical approach to questions of foreign policy. Those who believe that Americans reduce all issues of foreign policy to matters of right and wrong would do well to read this survey.

Percy W. Bidwell

April 1, 1954

CHAPTER ONE

The Inquiry

At his press conference on March 17, 1954, President Eisenhower was asked about the "new look" in our defense and foreign policy. He authorized direct quotation of his reply, which in part was as follows:

"...the world is suffering from a multiplicity of fears. We fear the men in the Kremlin, we fear what they will do to our friends around them; we are fearing what unwise investigators will do to us here at home...we fear depression, we fear the loss of jobs...we have got to look at each of those in its proper perspective...the reason they are feared is because there is a little element of truth in each, a little element of danger in each, and that means that finally there is left a little residue that you can meet only by faith in the destiny of America..."

When this inquiry on selected aspects of U.S. foreign policy was begun last January, it was commonly suspected that fear of one kind or another was an important element in the reactions of many citizens to problems confronting the country. It was hoped that the inquiry would prove or disprove this; that it would disclose the inter-play of emotion and reason in a cross-section of responsible Americans. These objectives, we feel, have been achieved, judging by the respondents' comments in the following chapters.

It remains to add that this summary of opinions is not intended to contribute technical knowledge but rather to illustrate the attitudes of the respondents and the degree of importance which they attach to considerations now the subject of controversy in the free world.

The Participants

The views under inspection are those of 800 men who are leading citizens in twenty-five cities from Boston to Seattle and from St. Paul-Minneapolis to

Houston. All are members of informal discussion groups known as Committees on Foreign Relations, which are affiliated with the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City.

Approximately once a month from October through May members of each Committee come together for an evening of concentrated discussion with a guest of special competence in the field of international affairs. The purpose of their meetings is to enable the men jointly to consider international aspects of United States political, economic, strategic and financial problems, so that when there is occasion for them to express their views elsewhere, they may do so upon a basis of previous reflection and study.

Once a year the Council on Foreign Relations undertakes to ascertain the views of Committee members on specific issues of major concern to the United States. To this end it asks the members to express themselves in writing, in response to a detailed inquiry prepared by the Council. This report is based upon their replies to such an inquiry.

While a few of the men responding are "professionals" in the sense that their daily work keeps them in more or less close touch with developments here and abroad, the majority are to be considered as laymen without special training or qualification as "experts" in the area with which this study is concerned. Some are men of national prominence; many are widely known throughout their own states. All have this in common: a sober concern for the security and well-being of the United States and the conviction that the better informed the individual, the likelier the prospect of his being able to distinguish between measures which advance and which retard American interests.

Their Professions or Occupations

43% (343) of the 800 participants are businessmen. They include board chairmen, presidents and other executive officers of a wide variety of American

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corporations -- large enterprises, moderate-sized and relatively small. For example: public utilities; oil, steel, chemical, lumber, automobile and insurance companies; aircraft and textile manufacturers; producers of building materials, machinery and electrical equipment; banks and banking houses; brokerage firms; publishers; and retailers.

17% (137) are lawyers and judges in Federal, state and municipal courts.

14% (112) are educators -- presidents of state and private universities and colleges, deans, professors, and public school administrators.

6% (46) are newspaper and magazine editors, editorial writers, and radio and television news commentators.

20% (162) are engaged in other professions or occupations, none of which is represented by more than three per cent of the aggregate. They include engineers, physicians, clergymen, retired officers of the regular Army and Navy, representatives of labor unions, farmers, and holders of Federal, state and municipal offices.

Geographical Distribution

The participants are members of Committees on Foreign Relations in cities geographically represented as follows:

Northeast: Boston, Providence, Philadelphia

Southeast: Charlottesville, Louisville, Nashville, Birmingham, Atlanta

Middle: Detroit, Indianapolis, St. Louis, Des Moines, Omaha, St. Paul-Minneapolis

Southwest: Little Rock, Tulsa, Houston, Albuquerque

Mountain: Denver, Salt Lake City, Boise

Pacific: Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles

Nature of the Inquiry

The inquiry on which this report is based consisted of questions and declarative statements, carefully calculated to bring out the respondents' views on U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union and Communist China, relations with our allies, the requirements for admission of Communist China to membership in the United Nations, trade with Iron Curtain countries, and fundamental principles governing the posture of the free world.

The composition of the inquiry was such as to oblige respondents to test for themselves the consistency of their replies. Since the drawing up of an adequate questionnaire on these problems presented unusual difficulties, special pains were taken to bring out the respondents' views generally, apart from questions designed to elicit a response that could be represented statistically.

To encourage frank expression, the participants were assured that neither as individuals nor as Committees would they be associated by name with specific findings. To facilitate the classification and interpretation of responses, they were asked to indicate their professions and occupations.

The respondents were reminded that the Council on Foreign Relations takes no stand, expressed or implied, on any aspect of American policy.

General Observations

The inquiry was distributed by the Council in early February, 1954. In the month allotted to completion of participants' work on the inquiry, events occurred abroad and at home which may have influenced the nature of some of the responses. While this report is concerned both with the

views of participants and with their reasons for holding them, it has been impracticable to try to identify in relative order of importance the factors causing participants to think as they do about the issues under consideration. The diversity involved here is infinite, rooted as it is in professional outlook, political orientation, and knowledge and degree of interest in the problems composing the inquiry.

Some of the participants responded in great detail; others indicated their views succinctly. Some referred to press reports and other published material which had influenced their thinking. Some drew upon personal experience abroad to point up their comments about American policy. Some observed that they had little or no information upon which to base judgments. Many complained that the inquiry was too difficult and that they found it almost impossible to give meaningful answers to some of the questions. In this connection, comments such as the following were by no means rare: "My knowledge here is scant"; "In spite of my reading and experience abroad, I just don't know the answer"; "I could write a book about this but it would be based on my prejudice rather than my knowledge"; "You could put what I know about this on the head of a pin."

Besides statistical representation of the total response in the various categories, percentages of affirmative, negative and uncertain comment by regions and by professions or occupations were figured, for purposes of comparison. It was discovered that, on occasion, answers by regional groups varied considerably. For example, the Northeast and Pacific groups were sometimes quite close together but at some distance, percentage-wise, from other geographical groups. The Southwest group was farther above or below the average more often than any other group. In the statistical break-down by professions or occupations, educators were

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farther above or below the average more often than any other group.

It is perhaps wise to emphasize here that this study is not a survey of "public opinion" in the areas represented. It is rather an amalgam of the considered views of a group of men in positions of influence, whose conclusions may or may not accord with those prevailing in their communities.

CHAPTER TWO

Summary of Findings

Unless otherwise indicated, the findings below reflect the composite opinions of the majority of the 800 men who participated in this inquiry, and are based upon considerations represented in all categories of response, as reported in the correspondingly numbered sections of Chapter Three:

1. Overwhelming general agreement (94%) with present U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. Pronounced tendency to take exception to specific aspects of the U.S. posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

2. General agreement (78%) with present U.S. policy toward Communist China. Greater disposition than in 1. to criticize U.S. policy, while expressing general agreement with it.

3. Belief (69%) that from the point of view of achieving declared objectives, time is on the side of the free rather than the communist world.

4. Belief (53%) that proof of communist good faith should not be a prerequisite to U.S. participation in negotiations intended to settle specific issues; that "communist good faith" should not be the criterion of whether the United States will or will not participate in such negotiations.

5. Overwhelming support (95%) for continued diplomatic efforts by the United States to settle issues on which it is in conflict with communist countries.

6. Belief (61%) that, on the whole, the United States is measuring up to the responsibilities of leadership in the coalition of free nations.

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7. No majority in answer to this question: Which of our allies are giving the United States as much support as they ought to? Britain was listed by 32% of all respondents; Turkey by 26%; West Germany by 15%; Greece by 11%; Canada by 10%; Netherlands by 10%; Belgium by 8%; no other country was listed by more than 3%.

8. No majority in answer to this question: Which of our allies are giving the United States less support than they ought to? France was listed by 44% of all respondents; Italy by 24%; Britain by 12%; no other country was listed by more than 3%.

9. No majority in answer to this question: In your opinion, are the difficulties of our exercising effective leadership in the free world likely (a) to continue at about the present level, or (b) to increase, or (c) to decrease? Answers: (a)--37%; (b)--45%; (c)--11%; uncertain--7%.

10. Belief (51%) that present U.S. policy reflects enough concern rather than too much or too little concern for the national interests of our allies.

11. Predominant opposition (82%) to the admission now of Communist China to membership in the United Nations. General disposition to refrain from commitment now to a firm posture of opposition, with respect to the future.

12. Opposition (63%) to having the United States agree to the admission of Communist China to membership in the United Nations, if the Soviet Union were to agree to the admission of such countries as Japan, Italy, West Germany.

13. Opposition (56%) to having the United States agree to the admission of Communist China to membership in the United Nations, if Communist China were to withdraw its military forces from North Korea and release all Americans who are held as prisoners.

14. Predominant opposition (77%) to having Congress prohibit all U.S. trade with Iron Curtain countries.

15. No majority in answer to this question: Should the United States reduce the pressure which it has been exerting upon Western European countries to discourage them from trading with Iron Curtain countries? Answers: Yes--50%; No--39%; Uncertain--11%.

16. Predominant support (75%) for having our allies in Western Europe increase their sales of non-strategic goods to the Soviet bloc, if this were to bring about substantial improvement in the allied dollar-balance position.

17. Vehement opposition (81%) to having the United States and its allies be willing to conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union, providing for a Soviet guarantee of non-aggression in Western Europe, in return for allied recognition of Soviet hegemony in Iron Curtain countries.

CHAPTER THREE

Statistics of the Response

In the following pages the questions in the inquiry are printed in italics. The percentages given in each section indicate the relative position of the respondents on the issues under consideration. Statistics for the various categories of response are best understood when read in the light of the comments illustrating the range and diversity of opinions within each category.

1. Are you in general agreement or disagreement with present U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union?

	General Agreement	General Disagreement	Uncertain
	(percentage distribution)		
All respondents.....	94	5	1
By regions:			
Northeast.....	98	2	0
Southeast.....	90	9	1
Middle.....	92	6	2
Southwest.....	93	6	1
Mountain.....	92	6	2
Pacific.....	97	3	0
By professions or occupations:			
Businessmen.....	92	6	2
Lawyers.....	95	5	0
Educators.....	95	5	0
Editors.....	92	8	0
Others.....	92	6	2

In his Cleveland speech of November 18, 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles described the spirit animating the Administration's foreign policy, and concluded his remarks with these words: "To carry on, we need public support. We do not ask for uncritical support. But we do ask for support which is understanding and which does not demand a perfection

which is humanly unattainable."

At the beginning of the second year of the Eisenhower Administration, the overwhelming majority of respondents in this inquiry expressed general agreement with U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. Many did so in terms according with Secretary Dulles' request for "support which is understanding." Their comments frequently disclosed appreciation of the magnitude and complexity of the problems facing the United States. Thus: "Agreement -- we should recognize that we cannot solve all of the world's problems at one sitting, or indeed in one generation"; "Agreement -- no single policy is going to work, as a formula, everywhere at every time -- as a framework within which to conduct foreign policy, we are taking a real step forward"; "Agreement -- no one, thinking in terms of a rational and peaceful world, could be satisfied with our policy, but prevailing circumstances seem to offer no feasible alternative."

Of the respondents who spelled out their position, however, many more than those in the above category made it clear that theirs was anything but "uncritical support." For the most part, their comments were of the "agree, but" variety, and could be placed in three main groupings, as follows:

First, those who favored taking a stronger position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union: "Agree -- but our policy ought to be more aggressive and positive"; "Agree, although I do not think our policy is firm enough"; "Agree -- but our policy should be more vigorous"; "Agree -- but we could be more dynamic"; "Agree -- but we should stand up to Russia more."

Second, those who favored a more flexible attitude: "Agree -- but we are not doing enough to explore and exploit the areas of agreement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. -- we seem to make the same efforts at obstinacy, for which we criticize the Russians"; "Agree -- but we seem to be doing little

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or nothing to make it worthwhile for those who can to change Russia"; "Agree -- but we should not oppose everything the Soviets want, because on rare occasions their demands are not unreasonable."

Third, those who were disturbed by American emphasis on atomic weapons:

"Agree -- though I am fearful that the threat to use massive atomic power, contained in Secretary Dulles' address to the Council on Foreign Relations on January 12, 1954, may prove to be a dangerous turn in our policy";

"Agree -- although we have made too many threats about atomic warfare";

"Agree -- although I believe we err in making so much use of the atomic threat."

Very few of the five per cent who were in general disagreement with U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union gave specific reasons for their stand. Most comments in this category dwelt upon the "hot-or-cold" nature of U.S. policy. Thus: "Disagree -- so vacillating as to be without substance";

"Disagree -- our policy was first complete trust and now complete animosity -- a middle-ground position is the sane course." A few felt so strongly about the need for taking a stronger position vis-a-vis Russia that they were impelled to register disagreement in this manner: "Disagree -- we are too soft toward the Soviet Union"; "Disagree -- Eisenhower and Dulles have not lived up to their campaign promises of liberation efforts short of war -- they are following the old defeatist containment policy."

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2. Are you in general agreement or disagreement with present U.S. policy toward Communist China?

	General Agreement	General Disagreement	Uncertain
	(percentage distribution)		
All respondents.....	78	17	5
By regions:			
Northeast.....	81	17	2
Southeast.....	74	20	6
Middle.....	77	17	6
Southwest.....	80	15	5
Mountain.....	83	15	2
Pacific.....	75	17	8
By professions or occupations:			
Businessmen.....	83	12	5
Lawyers.....	79	18	3
Educators.....	71	20	9
Editors.....	79	13	8
Others.....	79	18	3

Nearly four-fifths of the respondents expressed general agreement with present U.S. policy toward Communist China. As compared with the statistics of their support of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, there was a drop of sixteen per cent. There was, moreover, greater disposition to question U.S. policy, while expressing general agreement with it. Comments of respondents generally bore upon three issues: recognition of Communist China by the United States, the admission of Communist China to the United Nations, and the role of Nationalist China. A great many respondents recorded themselves as being in general agreement with U.S. policy toward Communist China, while at the same time deprecating official policy on one or more of these issues. The following paragraphs illustrate their reasoning:

"Agree, though I would like to see more flexibility on the 'recognition' question -- we have little enough to bargain with"; "Agree, but the time will come when we will have to recognize the existing government in China, like it

or not"; "Agree, but I have decided reservations on the refusal to recognize Communist China"; "Agree, but I feel that we are reacting on moral and emotional grounds rather than on solid and diplomatic grounds -- we should not foreclose the possibility of recognition, for it is our one good weapon."

"Agree, but I do not favor flat opposition to Communist China's membership in the U.N."; "Agree -- I do not favor Communist China's admission to the U.N. at present, but neither do I favor barring ourselves from such a course later on"; "Agree, but I disapprove even of contemplating the admission of Communist China to the U.N."; "Agree, provided we continue to oppose Communist China's membership in the U.N."

"Agree, but I have no faith in reliance on Chiang Kai-shek as a rallying point for overthrow"; "Agree, but I believe we should support Nationalist landings in China with arms, ships and planes."

Slightly more than one-fifth of the respondents put themselves on record as being in general disagreement with, or uncertain about, U.S. policy toward Communist China. It was clear from the remarks of many respondents in these categories that their disagreement was based upon considerations cited by the respondents in the preceding paragraphs, who registered general agreement.

Thus: "I am in general disagreement -- it is beyond me how we could fight a war to a draw with a nation, deal with that nation on equal terms in an armistice, invite the same nation to a general 'peace conference', and still say that we do not recognize the government which controls that nation"; "Mao is de facto in control of China -- it is impossible to negotiate with him on Far Eastern problems (including Indo-China) unless he is recognized as a de facto ruler"; "To refuse to recognize a de facto government may have some value in domestic politics, but I see no merit

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in it as a means of encouraging non-Communist Chinese to resist Mao, or whatever it is that we are to achieve by non-recognition"; "Disagreement -- we must recognize Red China as soon as we can get an adequate concession in return -- we must offer alternatives to China rather than to throw her further toward Russia."

"Disagreement -- we should find some decent way to seat Communist China in the UN -- which need not carry approval of the Reds"; "Disagreement -- I think it is about time that we stated that the United States will not support, or give equipment for, any attempt by Nationalist China to invade the mainland."

3. From the point of view of achieving declared objectives, do you think that time is on the side of the free or the communist world?

	Free World	Communist World	Uncertain
	(percentage distribution)		
All respondents.....	69	17	14
By regions:			
Northeast.....	65	12	23
Southeast.....	67	17	16
Middle.....	70	18	12
Southwest.....	73	18	9
Mountain.....	71	16	13
Pacific.....	65	18	17
By professions or occupations:			
Businessmen.....	71	16	13
Lawyers.....	61	17	22
Educators.....	76	13	11
Editors.....	70	20	10
Others.....	66	21	13

A principal reason for asking this question was to encourage the respondents to express convictions based upon critical appraisal rather than upon emotional commitment. The comments clearly showed the respondents' desire to avoid wishful thinking and to register their views dispassionately.

That they were on the whole successful in this endeavor was evident in their weighing of free world prospects versus those of the communist world. In general, there was acknowledgment of the case for each world and no pronounced disposition to state without qualification that time is on the side of either. Representative comments of the majority, who felt that time is on the side of the free world, were as follows:

"The free world has the advantage -- while admittedly the promises of the Communists have far greater appeal to hungry, ill-clad, ill-housed people, than the spiritual appeal of freedom, the fact remains that the industrial and technical strength of the free world is a deterrent which has yet to be capitalized on to the very best advantage"; "Basically for the free world, since I do not believe that a slave and godless people can in the long run conquer a people who are free to progress through the exercise of individual initiative and who have a belief in God"; "Time is on the side of the free world, not so much because it is effectively organized to achieve its objectives as because the communist world is more subject to internal deterioration and chaos"; "Time is on the side of the free world, assuming that the revolutionary ferment in many parts of the world is given direction and leadership by the free world, rather than letting the Soviets lead by default."

Slightly less than one-third of the respondents felt that on balance the advantage lay with the communist world, or that it was a toss-up between the two. Their reasoning frequently took these forms:

"I lean to the feeling that time, unfortunately, is slightly on the Red side -- I would like to think that truth, in the long run, will win for the free world, but many millions born in communist countries in the past fifteen years have had no opportunity to hear the truth, or hearing it, recognize it"; "Communist side -- it is easier to knock down than uphold the status quo"; "The communist world, due to our foreign aid program -- we are

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bleeding ourselves economically, which will eventually play into the hands of the Communists, both here and abroad"; "Communist side -- the Soviets have been the beneficiaries of all the time that has elapsed since the signing of the San Francisco Charter."

"Time is on both sides and in time we may learn to live with Communism"; "Evenly balanced in the scale of time"; "I hope it is on the side of the free world but I believe it is dangerous to assume that it is"; "It depends on the length of time"; "It depends on who declares the 'objectives'."

4. Should proof of communist good faith be a prerequisite to United States participation in negotiations intended to settle specific issues?

	Yes	No	Uncertain
	(percentage distribution)		
All respondents.....	42	53	5
By regions:			
Northeast.....	32	64	4
Southeast.....	36	60	4
Middle.....	42	53	5
Southwest.....	60	37	3
Mountain.....	54	38	8
Pacific.....	30	65	5
By professions or occupations:			
Businessmen.....	47	47	6
Lawyers.....	35	62	3
Educators.....	26	70	4
Editors.....	42	55	3
Others.....	49	45	6

To the majority of respondents who explained their position here the key-word in the question was "proof". Many asked, what do you mean by "proof"? and commented that there is no such thing as "communist good faith." The intent in posing the question was precisely to elicit the respondents' reaction to this phrase, which has had wide popular use. Regardless of whether they

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answered in the affirmative or negative, those who explained their reasoning usually took pains to convey complete distrust of communist intent. Thus: "The obvious answer to the question is 'yes,' but the very concept of 'good faith' is totally alien to the whole Communist ideology -- I cannot grasp the logic of many of my fellow-citizens who constantly clamor for 'reaching agreements' with the Soviet Union"; "Definitely no -- any such proof would have to be forged -- we have conclusive proof that 'good faith' and Marxism (or Soviet Communism) are incompatible."

On the whole, those answering in the affirmative were less disposed than those in the negative to cite reasons in support of their position. Scores of respondents limited themselves to a succinct 'yes'. Typical responses of those who spelled out their affirmative stand: "Yes -- past evidence of Communist lack of good faith makes it necessary that some guarantee of performance accompany any future settlement"; "Yes, but their basic philosophy is such that they never tell the truth"; "Yes, though sometimes, where the risk is not too great, we shall have to take their 'good faith' on faith."

As the percentages indicate, more than half of the respondents answered in the negative. A great many of them expressed their belief that regardless of the issue of communist 'good faith,' the United States should continue to try to settle specific issues by negotiation. Thus: "No -- negotiating is preferable to warring -- the possibility of war is somewhat deterred and some understanding is achieved"; "No -- we should negotiate whenever the opportunity arises, even though no specific issues are settled, for we learn something if we are wise and they learn something about the strength of free men"; "No -- to expect good faith is chimerical -- we should negotiate whenever it would seem that we might improve the situation"; "No --

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I doubt whether any side has ever felt that its opponent was motivated by good faith"; "No -- proof is a myth -- get as much as you can, but still negotiate"; "No -- we err in attempting to superimpose a moral judgment on other nations before even deigning to discuss a matter with them"; "No -- if the United States ceases to participate in the negotiation of specific issues, because of a lack of proof of communist good faith, nothing will be gained -- we have no alternative but to continue attempts at negotiation, if for no other reason than to demonstrate again and again that communist words do not correspond with communist deeds."

5. Should the United States continue to seek the settlement by diplomacy of issues on which it is in conflict with communist countries?

	Yes	No	Uncertain
	(percentage distribution)		
All respondents.....	95	3	2
By regions:			
Northeast.....	99	1	0
Southeast.....	94	4	2
Middle.....	96	3	1
Southwest.....	94	4	2
Mountain.....	90	2	8
Pacific.....	95	3	2
By professions or occupations:			
Businessmen.....	94	3	3
Lawyers.....	96	2	2
Educators.....	97	3	0
Editors.....	100	0	0
Others.....	94	4	2

When the question of whether or not the United States should continue to try to settle issues by diplomacy was posed, very few respondents indeed were willing to answer in terms other than affirmative. Among the five per cent who were uncertain or who replied in the negative, the chief misgivings seemed to be as follows: "No -- the seeking of settlements is

regarded by the Communists as weakness on our part"; "No -- any settlements so obtained would merely be a breather for the communists, while they prepared for still further pressures against the free world."

The attitude of the overwhelming majority was that, on balance, the United States stands to gain rather than to lose from continuing efforts to settle issues by diplomatic means. Many who answered in the affirmative had in mind considerations other than the successful settlement of specific issues. For example: "Yes -- not with the expectation of any immediate results but to show the world that it is the Communists who block peace"; "Yes -- we should not be in the position before the world of refusing to negotiate"; "Yes -- diplomacy can persuade the Communists that peaceful strength is a force beyond their power to overcome"; "Yes -- words are cheaper than lives or bombs"; "Yes -- there is real value in becoming better acquainted with the methods of communist leaders"; "Yes -- I underscore the value of diplomacy as a means of educating world opinion."

The views of a substantial number of respondents on the posture which should characterize the U.S. position in diplomatic negotiation with the Communists were set forth in these terms: "Yes -- but we should not surrender any point in the position of the capitalist world"; "Yes -- diplomacy backed up by sound and dependable counsel from business and military leaders, not by the State Department brand of diplomacy"; "Yes -- but this does not mean that we should make concessions"; "Yes -- but we should display the iron hand within our sometimes too-silken glove"; "Yes -- but with the United States becoming stronger and more aggressive in demanding freedom for enslaved peoples"; "Yes -- but with a much firmer hand and with a definite policy to the effect that we must have certain results, 'or else!'"

6. Do you think that the United States is measuring up to the responsibilities of leadership in the coalition of free nations?

	Yes	No	Uncertain
	(percentage distribution)		
All respondents.....	61	33	6
By regions:			
Northeast.....	64	31	5
Southeast.....	49	38	13
Middle.....	64	30	6
Southwest.....	66	29	5
Mountain.....	64	31	5
Pacific.....	60	37	3
By professions or occupations:			
Businessmen.....	61	31	8
Lawyers.....	65	34	1
Educators.....	60	31	9
Editors.....	64	33	3
Others.....	59	35	6

So far as could be determined, a majority of those answering in the affirmative had in mind the immense complexities of free world leadership, and felt that, on the whole, the United States is measuring up as it should at this stage. A great many respondents in this category tempered their affirmative response with references to developments at home and abroad which, in their opinion, hinder the full exercise of U.S. leadership. The two following paragraphs illustrate the considerations which were most frequently cited:

"Yes -- within the framework of existing international tensions and often conflicting loyalties, I think we are steering a pretty clear course";
 "Yes -- we are gaining maturity the hard way"; "Yes -- the leaders of friendly nations respect the soundness of our official acts."

"Yes -- although some of our trade policies and the mouthings of ambitious politicians weaken our position among the rank and file of our allies"; "Yes -- but it will continue to be a difficult course between being accused of brow-

beating our allies and leading them properly"; "Yes -- although lack of unity in Congress is a handicap."

On the whole, the respondents who replied in the negative (one-third of the total) tended more than those in the affirmative to spell out their reactions. These may be classed in three broad categories, as follows:

First: "No -- although our failure is more the result of a badly-divided American public opinion than lack of boldness or initiative on the part of our policy makers"; "No -- we support too often the forces of regression for our own ends, or for the ends of certain domestic groups"; "No -- too much latent isolationism is impairing the effectiveness of our leadership"; "No -- the real dangers of McCarthyism and the exaggerations of its dangers in Europe are robbing us of a good measure of our intellectual leadership."

Second: "No -- we must 'firm up' our policies and not be pushed around"; "No -- leadership requires far more grit, determination and something of the iron fist -- this is absolutely the only language which a Communist understands"; "No -- a leader should lead and should bring the recalcitrant free nations into mutual agreement -- you cannot lead and at the same time let others lead you around, which is what we are permitting."

Third: "No -- we are assuming leadership responsibilities in areas which are none of our business, and we are inviting a great many difficulties which could and should be avoided by minding our own affairs"; "No -- we would do a better job if we would streamline the whole business and cut out a lot of the fat and wasteful methods."

7. Which of our allies are giving the United States as much support as they ought to?

Twenty-six per cent of the respondents refrained from identifying any ally as giving the United States as much support as it ought to. A few of the respondents in this category provided explanatory comment, which took such

forms as the following:

"I have no way of knowing"; "This is a highly difficult question to handle -- what is the test for 'ought to?'"; "I do not feel competent to answer this, but I do not feel too critical of any of them"; "One cannot sort out allies"; "If we were being fully effective as a leader, they might all be said to be doing less than they should -- their failure to measure up may result from our failure in effective leadership"; "The assumption that the United States has all the wisdom or can demand 'support' is dangerous"; "This is a tough one and I am not settled about it -- I refuse, however, to go 'all out' in condemning those UN members who failed to do a comparable job with us in Korea."

Sixteen per cent of the respondents wrote the word, "None," as their answer to the question. Seven per cent gave "All," or "Most," as their answer.

The remaining 51% listed one or more countries which, in their opinion, are giving the United States as much support as they ought to. Britain was listed by 63% of these respondents (32% of all respondents). Turkey was listed by 51% (26% of all); West Germany by 30% (15% of all); Greece by 21% (11% of all); Canada by 20% (10% of all); Netherlands by 19% (10% of all); Belgium by 15% (8% of all). No other country was listed by more than 5% (3% of all).

8. Which of our allies are giving the United States less support than they ought to?

Twenty-five per cent of the respondents refrained from identifying any ally as giving the United States less support than it ought to. A few of the respondents in this category provided explanatory comment, which took such forms as the following:

"This is difficult to judge, as the situations in individual countries are an important factor, and I am not familiar enough here to pass judgment"; "This question can only be answered if one assumes that all we do or propose

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is wise and just, and infers a moral 'ought' or 'must' that does not exist in fact"; "I prefer not to answer this -- why should we say how much support other countries should give us? -- they act supposedly in their own interests and assume that we do likewise -- a similar assumption on our part would contribute to realism, at the expense of hypocrisy"; "From time to time they all seem to be lagging -- it is part of our problem of leadership to prod -- I think no categorical answer is possible."

Seventeen per cent of the respondents wrote the word, "All," and let this stand as their answer. Similarly, four per cent gave "Most" as their answer, without further explanation. Other categories of answers which did not allude to specific countries totalled five per cent.

The remaining 49% of the respondents listed one or more countries which, in their opinion, are giving the United States less support than they ought to. France was listed by 90% of these respondents (44% of all respondents). Italy was listed by 48% (24% of all); Britain by 25% (12% of all). No other country was listed by more than 5% (3% of all).

9. In your opinion, are the difficulties of our exercising effective leadership in the free world likely (a) to continue at about the present level, or (b) to increase, or (c) to decrease?

	a	b	c	uncertain
	(percentage distribution)			
All respondents.....	37	45	11	7
By regions:				
Northeast.....	39	43	7	11
Southeast.....	42	41	12	5
Middle.....	35	47	9	9
Southwest.....	31	48	15	6
Mountain.....	39	45	10	6
Pacific.....	41	41	11	7

By professions or occupations:

Businessmen.....	38	45	10	7
Lawyers.....	44	43	7	6
Educators.....	35	46	13	6
Editors.....	23	51	13	13
Others.....	37	41	13	9

In answer to this question, one respondent who was "uncertain," commented thus: "The difficulties of our exercising effective leadership in the free world will fluctuate, depending in part upon the Soviet program and in part upon our own." If he appears to have been cautious in his response, he nevertheless expressed a common reaction, for it was clear that most of those who undertook to elaborate their reaction here -- and they were not many -- considered that the question called for no more than one's best guess. Such comment as was made indicated that the following considerations influenced the respondents:

"Our difficulties will continue at about the present level, because President Eisenhower has the right attitude of firmness and understanding, and as his experience grows, we will grow in terms of the leadership qualities required"; "Continue as at present, for leadership is a long, slow process of winning confidence."

"Increase, because we are not prepared to do the things that will take the pressure off our allies"; "Our difficulties will increase as long as the isolationist spirit is so strong"; "Our difficulties will increase in direct proportion to our activities in interfering with other nations' affairs"; "Likely to increase -- as Russian strength grows, Russian pressure will create new difficulties and greater tension"; "Our difficulties will probably increase as the pattern of the free world becomes more complex -- its very success will increase the difficulties and responsibilities"; "Increase, because allied nationalism and petty national interests are being placed above the necessity to cooperate with us."

"Decrease, as the merits of our policies are realized and we gain experience"; "Decrease, as long as we continue to be firm in our position and have the military strength to back it up"; "Decrease as we improve our policies under President Eisenhower's direction."

10. Does present U.S. policy reflect (a) enough concern, or (b) too much concern, or (c) too little concern for the national interests of our allies?

	a	b	c	uncertain
	(percentage distribution)			
All respondents.....	51	11	27	11
By regions:				
Northeast.....	53	10	23	14
Southeast.....	52	14	24	10
Middle.....	47	11	33	9
Southwest.....	57	13	21	9
Mountain.....	54	11	25	10
Pacific.....	44	11	32	13
By professions or occupations:				
Businessmen.....	50	17	22	11
Lawyers.....	61	6	23	10
Educators.....	44	4	41	11
Editors.....	44	2	41	13
Others.....	51	12	27	10

Roughly one-half of the respondents represented themselves as satisfied on the whole with the concern which the United States is displaying for the national interests of its allies. Although the respondents in this category were less disposed than the others to comment in support of their views, their thinking generally seemed to be along these lines:

"I feel that Secretary Dulles is doing a pretty good job in following orthodox diplomatic methods, combined with an occasional stiff warning which almost amounts to an ultimatum"; "My impression is that on the whole we are handling this satisfactorily, although our motives are not understood by the people in other countries and certainly a large proportion of our own

people has not the slightest conception of what our responsibilities entail"; "Our policy appears to be flexible and reflects enough concern -- in some respects we have exercised rare forbearance in making allowance for national interests -- where national interest is pursued by an ally in such a manner as to point to the seeking of undue advantage in a crisis, we should be instantly concerned"; "Generally enough concern, though a more discerning concern for our mutual interests in the long-run would suggest a wiser creditor policy on our part."

The group numbering 11%, who registered their belief that U.S. policy reflects too much concern, was usually divided between those who replied in very general terms and those who cited specific instances involving our allies. Thus: "Too much concern -- we have our problems and should tend to them -- we cannot support Europe and the Far East forever"; "Too much -- we should encourage our allies to do more for themselves -- 'the Lord helps those who help themselves.'"; "Too much concern -- we should be concerned only with our own interests, just as they are -- we have tried to take care of allied interests instead of letting them do that"; "Too much concern for France and Italy"; "Too much concern for Israel and Indo-China"; "Too much concern with regard to the colonial affairs of our European allies."

Slightly more than one-quarter of the respondents thought that U.S. policy reflects too little concern for the national interests of our allies. Here there was a much greater disposition than in any of the other categories to provide illustrative comment. The main groupings were as follows: "Too little concern, due to inadequate understanding of these peoples -- greater understanding of their cultures, way of life, totality of traditions and customs would advance our objectives"; "Too little concern -- we talk big about promoting world trade among our allies but all too often Congress votes

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the way our special interests dictate"; "Too little concern -- the Executive branch is sufficiently aware of this problem but Congress is not, and the Administration's unwillingness to stand up to Congress is not encouraging"; "Too little concern -- most of our allies are 'have-not' nations at the present time, and we are unable to put ourselves in their position to an extent sufficient to understand their short-range national interests"; "Too little concern -- an old saying is that 'rich folks sho got pretty ways' -- if we were under the same economic stresses as some of our allies, our own ways might not be so pretty."

11. Do you favor or oppose the admission now of Communist China to membership in the United Nations? Why do you favor or oppose admission now?

	Favor	Oppose	Uncertain
	(percentage distribution)		
All respondents.....	16	82	2
By regions:			
Northeast.....	16	84	0
Southeast.....	13	83	4
Middle.....	17	81	2
Southwest.....	18	81	1
Mountain.....	17	83	0
Pacific.....	14	82	4
By professions or occupations:			
Businessmen.....	13	85	2
Lawyers.....	18	81	1
Educators.....	25	72	3
Editors.....	8	92	0
Others.....	17	80	3

Scores of respondents who registered themselves in opposition made clear their view that, in principle, they were not opposed to the admission of Communist China to membership in the United Nations. Many of their opinions duplicated those quoted in answer to the second question of this inquiry, where respondents who were both in general agreement and disagreement with present

U.S. policy toward Communist China recorded their misgivings about the indefinite maintenance of an inflexible attitude on the question of Communist China's admission to the United Nations.

The reasoning of respondents in the above category took these forms: "Oppose now but favor it in principle"; "Oppose now but eventually Communist China should be admitted"; "Oppose now but all states ought to be members by virtue of being responsible sovereign states"; "Oppose now but I think it might be arranged in exchange for Communist concessions"; "Oppose now, but we have consented to the admission of other de facto Communist administrations."

Many other respondents registered their opposition in terms of principle and disclosed deeply-held convictions on the subject of Communist China's admission. Thus: "Oppose -- we cannot reward aggression -- this would be appeasement"; "Oppose -- they are a despotic form of government and have no regard for the rights of the individual -- we already have too many of that kind in the UN"; "Oppose -- to such an extent that I think we should withdraw from the UN, if Communist China is admitted"; "Oppose -- we have just been at war with Communist China and it is not yet really ended -- they have shamefully mistreated American prisoners and have never shown that their word is worth anything"; "Oppose -- they have demonstrated very clearly that their policy is anti-United States -- our State Department has been represented there by 'parlor pinks' who have had much more concern for China than for the folks at home and American business."

Slightly less than one-sixth of the respondents said that they were in favor of admitting Communist China now to membership in the UN. Reasons cited by them in support took these forms: "Favor -- because it is better to recognize facts than to live in a dream world -- the Peking government is

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a reality, it is effective and its voice is listened to in many quarters -- this voice we ought to hear openly in the forum of nations"; "Favor -- not recognizing a fact is, to my mind, foolish -- Communist China could not add any more confusion to the UN than already exists -- their untruths would be made clearer to the free nations by this closer contact"; "Favor -- we have Russia and other communist countries in the UN -- why not Communist China?"; "Favor -- it is a proven power and it is unrealistic to continue recognition of Chiang as China (on this point I have changed my mind in the past six months)"; "Favor -- the traditional American attitude, first stated by Jefferson, is that we recognize the regime in power, whether we like it or not"; "Favor -- I don't think the UN has much chance of success unless it includes all nations, friendly and inimical."

12. Would you be willing to have the United States agree to the admission of Communist China to membership in the United Nations, if the Soviet Union were to agree to the admission of such countries as Japan, Italy, West Germany?

	Yes	No	Uncertain
	(percentage distribution)		
All respondents.....	23	63	14
By regions:			
Northeast.....	21	65	14
Southeast.....	23	61	16
Middle.....	22	64	14
Southwest.....	20	65	15
Mountain.....	23	68	9
Pacific.....	30	54	16
By professions or occupations:			
Businessmen.....	21	64	15
Lawyers.....	22	61	17
Educators.....	37	48	15
Editors.....	15	67	18
Others.....	20	72	8

As the percentages indicate, there was much greater uncertainty here than was the case in answers to the preceding question. Apparently, the

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incentive of a possible quid pro quo contributed both to greater uncertainty and to a drop of nearly 20% in the number of respondents who said that they were against Communist China's admission now to the UN. At the same time, a slightly larger number of respondents gave affirmative answers.

The horse-trade implied in the question encountered the firm opposition of many respondents. Thus: "No -- this would be an unwarranted political exchange and a sacrifice of principle"; "No -- membership in the UN should never be a matter of bargaining"; "No -- all admissions should be on the basis of whether a particular candidate represents a sovereign state"; "No -- it would be a poor trade, for it would give Chinese Communist leaders 'face', which they do not deserve"; "No -- such bargaining of good against what is seemingly all bad would be against all that the United States stands for."

Among those giving affirmative answers there was frequently a disposition to assume satisfactory settlement of the wars in Korea and Indo-China. Thus: "Yes -- subject to reasonable settlement in Korea"; "Yes -- assuming an end to the fighting in Indo-China." Other affirmative comments also showed a willingness to consider the trade suggested in the question. Thus: "Yes -- I would forgo principle if a really satisfactory bargain could be struck"; "Yes -- I would trade horses with them, if I could have a look at the horses' teeth."

Relatively few of those who were "uncertain" provided explanatory comment; many of the 14% in this category limited themselves to "not sure," or drew question-marks in the space provided.

13. Would you be willing to have the United States agree to the admission of Communist China to membership in the United Nations, if Communist China were to withdraw its military forces from North Korea and release all Americans who are held as prisoners?

	Yes	No	Uncertain
	(percentage distribution)		
All respondents.....	28	56	16
By regions:			
Northeast.....	28	58	14
Southeast.....	28	62	10
Middle.....	28	53	19
Southwest.....	23	63	14
Mountain.....	27	63	10
Pacific.....	30	53	17
By professions or occupations:			
Businessmen.....	24	58	18
Lawyers.....	30	53	17
Educators.....	39	43	18
Editors.....	31	54	15
Others.....	25	65	10

While the proposition set forth in this question accounted for a further drop in the number of respondents opposing Communist China's admission to the UN, it was a relatively small drop -- 7%. Only 5% more respondents gave affirmative answers than did so in response to the preceding question. On the whole, illustrative comment duplicated that which accompanied answers to the preceding question, with much the same considerations in evidence.

The main categories of comment were as follows:

"Yes -- not only good bargaining but good Far Eastern diplomacy"; "Yes -- this would be evidence of good intention"; "Yes -- worth it to get American prisoners released"; "Yes -- this would be a big step in the right direction"; "Yes -- but this is purely academic -- they will not agree to any such terms."

"No -- we have had enough of appeasement and servile cringing"; "No -- one cannot bargain with the Communists except on their terms"; "No -- Communist China would still be branded as an aggressor nation and would have 'shot its way'

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into the UN"; "No -- this would be further evidence of weakness and would amount to appeasement for the sake of re-opening trade"; "No -- withdrawal from North Korea would mean nothing, for the armies would still be but a stone's throw away"; "No -- I don't think we can ask the Chinese to pull out unless we do, and I don't think we can do so and leave Syngman Rhee free to start the whole show going again,"

"Uncertain -- perhaps a step in the right direction -- but how far would they withdraw? -- would they permit inspection? -- how would we know that all American prisoners had been released?"; "Uncertain -- I am not sure that this objective should be obtained by concession -- perhaps it should be insisted on as a prerequisite to discussion"; "Uncertain -- shouldn't admission be coupled with settlements in Indo-China and elsewhere in South Asia?"

14. Should Congress prohibit all U.S. trade with Iron Curtain countries?

	Yes	No	Uncertain
	(percentage distribution)		
All respondents.....	18	77	5
By regions:			
Northeast.....	13	86	1
Southeast.....	22	73	5
Middle.....	15	82	3
Southwest.....	31	63	6
Mountain.....	20	71	9
Pacific.....	10	85	5
By professions or occupations:			
Businessmen.....	20	75	5
Lawyers.....	18	77	5
Educators.....	6	91	3
Editors.....	13	84	3
Others.....	23	71	6

As shown, more than three-quarters of the respondents were against having Congress prohibit all U.S. trade with Iron Curtain countries. Many of them expressed their views without qualification and in positive terms.

Thus: "No -- trading in non-war materials is one of the strongest weapons we possess"; "No -- we should use trade as a lever to capitalize on a given situation, and to help work out practical settlements of concrete issues"; "No -- unless we insist on isolating ourselves!"; "No -- this would be about as efficient as the Eighteenth Amendment -- some day the U.S. will learn that it cannot re-make the world by law"; "No -- this would cut off our noses to spite our faces."

Many others replied in the negative with comments of this kind: "No -- trade can lead to more understanding"; "No -- trade can teach the people of Russia and of the other Iron Curtain countries"; "No -- trade is the safest means of promoting peace"; "No -- trading with those countries might furnish opportunities of contact with the people, which in the end would change their attitude and promote their friendship."

Slightly less than one-fifth of the respondents favored the prohibition by Congress of all U.S. trade with Iron Curtain countries. Their reasons were various and included the following:

"Yes -- the shortages which, we are told, exist behind the Iron Curtain have contributed to popular dissatisfaction -- shipping needed goods would tend to lessen the tension -- we should try to foster such tension rather than diminish it"; "Yes -- it is outrageous for us to be striking at the countries behind the Iron Curtain with one arm and feeding them with the other -- certainly we should prohibit trade as far as we can do so"; "Yes -- if all trade by the western countries with Iron Curtain countries were prohibited, the ultimate result would be the realization by the Soviet Union that it must become more cooperative or stagnate"; "Yes -- this is our alternative to military force"; "Yes -- this would be one way of winning World War III before it starts."

Typical "uncertain" comments: "I don't know -- I cannot tell whether to do so would strengthen their military position, even if trade was restricted

to so-called non-strategic goods"; "Not sure -- this is an age of total conflict when synthetic production and transformation of bulk raw products make it difficult to say what is 'strategic' material and what is not."

15. Should the United States reduce the pressure which it has been exerting upon Western European countries to discourage them from trading with Iron Curtain countries?

	Yes	No	Uncertain
	(percentage distribution)		
All respondents.....	50	39	11
By regions:			
Northeast.....	51	36	13
Southeast.....	46	40	14
Middle.....	55	36	9
Southwest.....	41	50	9
Mountain.....	42	43	15
Pacific.....	60	33	7
By professions or occupations:			
Businessmen.....	46	42	12
Lawyers.....	47	43	10
Educators.....	67	25	8
Editors.....	57	33	10
Others.....	49	40	11

"We should try to see that any trade is helpful to our interests in the broad picture," commented one respondent. Among the fifty per cent who favored reduction of U.S. pressure, his was perhaps the most sweeping and unqualified response. The overwhelming majority of those who answered in the affirmative and who spelled out their reasoning made it clear that their answers covered only non-strategic materials. On this score, as on others, they were far more inclined to elaborate their views than was the case with respondents who were against the reduction of U.S. pressure. The main classes of affirmative comment were as follows:

"Yes -- otherwise we will further reduce the area of our leadership -- other nations need this trade and will expand it, regardless of our pressure";

"Yes -- such trade is inevitable; the pressures for it are mounting, as they will mount for U.S. trade with Iron Curtain countries"; "Yes -- certain European countries are dependent on foreign trade for their economic existence and should, with proper controls, be permitted without prejudice to trade with Iron Curtain countries"; "Yes -- in the interest of helping them to help themselves."

"Yes -- our tariff and other policies tend to limit the ability of Western European countries to deal with us, and they have to trade in order to live"; "Yes -- and we should make possible freer trade with the U.S. -- Western Europe would prefer to trade with us."

"Yes -- such trade, under proper safeguards, may prove to be the only effective method of breaking down the Iron Curtain"; "Yes -- our restrictions on East-West trade in non-strategic materials are helping to weaken western solidarity -- winning or losing the cold war is not going to hinge on East-West trade."

Representative comments in the negative:

"No -- our pressure should be increased, since the crippling or slowing down of the Soviet economy is to our advantage"; "No -- we should tighten the pressure, though I realize that this would cut across some of our own trade interests."

"No -- we should continue to exert all the pressure we can upon the Western European countries as a means of forcing the Soviet Union to come to a reasonable understanding with the free world."

"No -- I favor general suppression of East-West trade, but the test should be the strategic gain or loss in any specific instance"; "No -- but the corollary of this is that we cannot stand by and see the economic situation of our friends deteriorate through the lack of suitable trade outlets."

16. Would you be willing to have our allies in Western Europe increase their sales of non-strategic goods to the Soviet bloc, if this were to bring about substantial improvement in the allied dollar-balance position?

	Yes	No	Uncertain
	(percentage distribution)		
All respondents.....	75	17	8
By regions:			
Northeast.....	74	15	11
Southeast.....	73	18	4
Middle.....	77	15	8
Southwest.....	66	27	7
Mountain.....	74	18	8
Pacific.....	78	12	10
By professions or occupations:			
Businessmen.....	75	16	9
Lawyers.....	78	19	3
Educators.....	82	10	8
Editors.....	64	21	15
Others.....	71	22	7

To set the answers to this question in meaningful perspective, it should be recalled that 39% of the respondents were against reduction of the pressure which the United States has been exerting upon Western European countries to discourage them from trading with Iron Curtain countries (Question 15). However, only 17% expressed their opposition to having our allies in Western Europe increase their sales of non-strategic goods to the Soviet Bloc, if this were to bring about substantial improvement in the allied dollar-balance position. On the affirmative side, "yes" answers rose from 50% in response to Question 15, to 75% in response to Question 16.

Where those in the negative spelled out their reasoning, misgivings about what is a "non-strategic" material played an important part. Thus: "No -- name one that is non-strategic -- there is no merchandise that cannot be used in some way to feed, clothe, arm, doctor or house military forces"; "No -- non-strategic goods have a tendency to turn into strategic goods -- dollar-balance

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should be attained in other ways"; "No -- it is questionable whether, as wars are fought today, there is any such thing as non-strategic materials." Other negative answers were given for such representative reasons as the following: "No -- our allies can be helped in other ways, and it is important to keep up the economic pressure on the communist world"; "No -- I would not take the chance"; "No -- why strengthen our enemies?"; "No -- if, as a result, the Communists should grow stronger economically, their opposition and their propaganda would increase and become more effective -- we should not do anything to help in this direction."

Affirmative answers seemed not to differ in appreciable degree from those which were given in affirmative response to Question 15. Typical comments: "Yes -- it would obviously help our allies and ourselves"; "Yes -- restored trade will bring good-will quicker than diplomacy"; "Yes -- it is unreasonable of us to object to this, in view of our own trade policy and restrictions on imports"; "Yes -- even if it did not bring about substantial improvement in the allied dollar-balance position, other gains would justify it"; "Yes -- we fail to understand that for many countries, 'trade or starve' is a literal reality"; "Yes -- even if it did not affect the dollar-balance position one way or the other, such trade might soften communist support, and this alone would justify it"; "Yes -- but the guilt of the U.S. for the 'dollar shortage' is an over-played and hackneyed misnomer -- the real trouble lies in hoarding, improper distribution and unorthodox channeling of trade for selfish purposes."

17. Should the United States and its allies be willing to conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union, providing for a Soviet guarantee of non-aggression in Western Europe, in return for allied recognition of Soviet hegemony in Iron Curtain countries?

	Yes	No	Uncertain
	(percentage distribution)		
All respondents.....	9	81	10
By regions:			
Northeast.....	6	84	10
Southeast.....	9	85	6
Middle.....	11	81	8
Southwest.....	10	74	16
Mountain.....	6	84	10
Pacific.....	11	79	10
By professions or occupations:			
Businessmen.....	10	77	13
Lawyers.....	7	84	9
Educators.....	11	81	8
Editors.....	0	95	5
Others.....	11	83	6

No other question in this inquiry aroused such fervor and indignant rejection as were recorded in responses to this question. A great many respondents limited themselves to expletives, with or without exclamation points, which left no doubt about the depth of their distaste for the implications of the question. Many others registered their opposition in terms which had much in common. For example:

"No -- it would be a betrayal of the freedom-living people of the helpless satellite nations, to the lasting shame of the United States"; "Emphatically no -- that would be the same as denying the freedom of other peoples, in order to maintain our own -- a completely unmoral position"; "Absolutely not -- this would surrender all we stand for"; "No -- we must not 'recognize' their right to enslave others, even if we obtain something substantial in return."

Many others were in opposition for such reasons as the following: "No -- we should regard the Kremlin as a bandit gang to be exterminated by all means

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short of world war"; "No -- such an agreement would not be worth the paper it was written on"; "No -- of what value is a Soviet guarantee? -- we may be naive, but not that naive!"; "No -- Soviet guarantees are not to be trusted."

A minority of roughly one-fifth of the respondents was either in favor of the agreement referred to in the question, or was not sure whether to be in favor of it or to be against it. The reasoning here took these forms:

"Yes -- but we should not place much reliance on the Soviet guarantee"; "I would say 'yes,' if there was reasonable assurance that Russia would keep its side of the agreement"; "Yes -- with satisfactory definitions and safeguards"; "Possibly -- if the arrangement could be nailed down, it might be all right"; "This might be worth investigating, since Soviet hegemony is a fact which we can hardly change, short of military conflict"; "Yes -- this is an objective that should be considered, though I feel that the U.S. should never agree to the permanent division of East and West Germany."

CHAPTER FOUR

Supplementary Comments

The main purpose of this inquiry was to obtain the views of the respondents on specific issues of U.S. foreign policy. A related purpose was to encourage observations of a general nature, which would not necessarily be susceptible of statistical representation but which would disclose deeply-held convictions about the authentic objects of policy. It was realized that many of the problems raised in the inquiry had been much discussed throughout the country in terms of what was morally permissible for the United States, and what was not. In formulating the questions, it was anticipated that the judgments of the respondents would, in some degree, reflect the widespread public discussion of moral conduct. But how wide and deep would this be? Would the respondents exhibit a flexible or an inflexible conception of "right" and "wrong" in our relations with other nations?

In order to encourage their expression of opinion, and to shed additional light on their answers to the questions, two brief and unidentified statements were appended to the inquiry. Both were couched in terms of moral principle. The respondents were asked for their views on both:

a. The free world now has the moral initiative. We must sustain that initiative and never grow weary or become discouraged in the quest for honorable settlements of concrete issues.

b. We must stop deluding ourselves with the idea of "negotiating" with criminals. We must instead exalt morality. We cannot end tension merely by making a deal with the unmoral and the unscrupulous.

The first statement (a.) was taken from a speech of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. The second statement (b.) was an expression of the views of Mr. David Lawrence, syndicated columnist and Editor of the U.S. News & World Report.

As in their answers to the questions in the inquiry, many respondents replied succinctly: in this case, by checking a. or b., and by observing that they had already expressed themselves on the ideas implicit in the statements. The majority of the participants, however, wrote a paragraph or more to convey their reactions, and a few produced philosophical essays which went considerably beyond the scope of the statements.

A careful review of all of the comments indicated that about as many respondents found elements in both a. and b., with which they were in agreement, as expressed approval of a. and disapproval of b. A much smaller proportion chose b. and rejected a. Extracts from the comments, reproduced below, illustrate the considerations which were uppermost in the minds of the respondents, and convey, better than the shorter remarks already quoted, their conception of the appropriate course for the United States to pursue.

* * * *

"The first paragraph is an accurate statement of what our motivations and beliefs should be. It is stated without the taint of demagoguery and reflects a rational view of our obligation. The second paragraph might be made by a person having the same belief in the need for a moral approach as stated in a, but without the patience or realization of what it will take to accomplish our objectives. This statement rejects any hope for settlement. While negotiating for an honorable settlement, we can still bargain and outmaneuver an unmoral adversary while not sacrificing our integrity in doing so. John Foster Dulles has demonstrated that this is possible. We must negotiate, recognizing the odds and chances for success while doing it."

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"I don't know what you mean by 'moral initiative.' Our leadership is not necessarily 'moral' nor is our initiative. We are faced with a system and a point of view which adhere to points of view and values which, in almost every

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field, are the antithesis of our own. To oppose this system in every way we can has a great deal to do with self-preservation and very little to do with 'morality.' Of course, it would be 'nice' if we could survive in a 'moral' way -- our consciences would be less troubled -- but survive we must if we can. This puts the question of negotiating in a more reasonable and realistic perspective, free from all these subjective words like 'moral' or 'unmoral' which merely confuse the issue. We should negotiate where we think it will be to our advantage to do so -- or where our allies feel strongly enough to make it awkward not to -- and not negotiate where we think we'll get nothing out of it. This, it seems to me, is just good, practical politics that has nothing whatsoever to do with morality or moral leadership. Sometimes the negotiation might get somewhere -- the Russians might, for example, actually live up to an agreement for once -- but most of the time negotiation probably will be useful only in the limited sense of letting our allies see that the Russians haven't changed very much."

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"I agree with a. The quest for honorable settlements, though hitherto rather unproductive, at least gives proof of our own good faith and of our willingness to adhere to an orderly system of international conduct. The failure to pursue such a quest would discourage large groups of people both behind and near the Iron Curtain and would forfeit our leadership of the anti-Communist world.

"I do not understand b. There have to be negotiations; that these should be with 'criminals' is unfortunate, but it does not make the negotiations criminal or even undesirable. How does one exalt morality, unless it be by seeking 'honorable settlements'?"

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"Where has negotiating got us in the past? The 'false men' built up by Russia must all be knocked down before any negotiations should be considered."

* * * *

"I do not believe that we have the moral initiative, but I am sure that we must attempt to exercise effective leadership of our allies. This is essentially a struggle on all levels and we must work at it. To use phrases like moral initiative, etc., tends to minimize a difficult problem. In this struggle there are no 'moral victories' as in football. I have become impatient with the terminology in current use: it obscures the problem. This country has certain interests which it shares with others as well as interests peculiar to itself. It is our task to promote those interests. International agreements do not have a 'moral' law; they stem from national interest. I am not advocating war or aggression or armed demonstrations, but let's get on with the job without fanfare or verbiage."

* * * *

"Exalting morality and refusing to negotiate is no policy. In the first place, we have not done a good job of selling morality. The neutrals certainly are not buying it. In the second place, refusal to negotiate with 'criminals' necessarily involves increasing dependence on a military solution, which can't be sold either. Nations have always acted on the basis of self-interest. We should certainly continue to try to reach limited agreement on concrete problems. To the extent that limited agreement can be found, the possibility of a more general settlement is increased."

* * * *

"The record clearly upholds b. from the fall of Rome to Munich. The Soviet view toward 'moral initiative' is best expressed in Stalin's contemptuous query about the Pope: 'How many divisions has he got?' And while we are 'exalting morality' let us not curtail our production of long-range

bombers, interceptors and jet fighters."

* * * *

"In full agreement with a. Although a dismal prospect, I feel that tension will be the norm for the next 10 to 20 years, no matter what we do. Since I feel that we cannot end tension by making deals, we must learn to live with tension and maintain our moral position. By 'dealing', we would lose the latter and gain nothing."

* * * *

"The moral initiative is wonderful but it accomplishes nothing with such tough, ruthless characters as those who rule the communist world. There is only one thing they understand, and that is power at the spot that hurts. This power should be shoved at them at every possible occasion short of war, and we should not be frightened of the possibility of war, if it comes to that. We now have the weapons to carry out this objective and fright should cease to be a concern to any of us. However, any time an honorable settlement can be made on concrete issues, it should be sought with every means at our disposal."

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"I believe the whole philosophy of b. is unsound. The bomb at Hiroshima did many things, but did it in any way 'exalt morality'?"

"To pursue a. is clearly to take on a very difficult, costly, wearing and even thankless task, but there is no other choice open to the people of the free world. The western peoples act upon the broad basis of Christian morality and for all the backsliding, selfishness, criminality and cynicism which we can display in abundance, our course is unquestionably set toward a freer world in which personal freedom (and limitations on it willingly made for the good of all) are the twin goals. I believe that the whole western world generally goes along with the 'Four Freedoms' and that we make progress toward them for ourselves and for others. We can probably kill a lot of Russians and Red Chinese with atom

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or other bombs and we may still have an edge in the armaments race. We should try to hold on to it for we should not be so silly as to suppose that mere supineness will gain anything but disaster. But killing a lot of Reds will not bring freedom to them or in the end to us. What we must do above all, and we must do it by ourselves when we must and with other peoples whenever we can, is work slowly toward the goal of making peace attractive to everyone."

* * * *

"I agree with a. but feel that it is interpreted too narrowly -- it should be extended to our relationship with all countries, enemy or allied. To me, b. involves a form of international McCarthyism -- I think we can broaden other cultures only by a slow process of good example, tolerance, and self-examination. We have not yet been invested with a mantle of perfection."

* * * *

"Paragraph a. is false, b. is true. The government of Russia is illegitimate. It does not rest on the consent of the governed. It attacked and seized Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland and parts of Finland in violation of solemn non-aggression pacts with those countries. It was rightfully expelled from the League of Nations for invading Finland. We should hold out every hope to the millions of persecuted people in Russia and China that we will aid their liberation and that we will never put our seal of approval on the evil men who are holding them captive."

* * * *

"Paragraph a. is sensible as a basis of policy, unless we mean not only to cease treating with Russia, et al., but also to cancel our engagements with Spain, Yugoslavia, Colombia, Argentina, Guatemala, San Salvador and all other admittedly 'totalitarian' states which are now 'doing business' with us. Morality is not a coalition with all other evil forces against one designated malefactor;

it is aloofness from all evil contacts."

* * * *

"I go along with the policy expressed in a. Only by a 'step by step' approach can we hope to solve the problems which are plaguing the world today. It will take years to reduce the tensions which have been created. I think the policy expressed in b. is too idealistic to be workable in the imperfect world in which we live. We are guilty of too many of the charges which are leveled against us to take such a high and mighty attitude toward the Soviet."

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"Frankly I think it is a high and mighty assumption to consider that we are 100% pure, holy and moral, and that the U.S.S.R. is completely the opposite. Some Russians may honestly feel that we are the capitalist war-mongering hypocrites they say we are. We feel that our ideals are better, we can pile up economic and social statistics to prove this, but I don't think fanaticism and complete intolerance -- of the Soviet brand -- will get us anywhere. Bitter enemies have negotiated before and we may do so again. In the meantime, 'keep our powder dry' and 'carry a big stick'."

* * * *

"We need to stop thinking of ourselves as always right. We need to recognize the confusion caused in European minds when we line up Spain, Jugoslavia, etc., as 'free' countries. We need to remember what an armed Germany has meant to her neighbors. Having fought Germans, I am more fearful of them than of Russians. I think Russian strength highly over-rated."

* * * *

"I agree with a. Paragraph b. is too strong. We can negotiate where we can limit the risks. It is possible to negotiate with a criminal if you can force him to live up to his agreements. Until good faith has been consistently demonstrated, we should not give up any position until a more advantageous one

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is in our possession. Ultimately the Russians and Chinese are likely to be represented by men who believe that acting consistently in good faith will best advance their own interests. When this is so, we should be able to negotiate, regardless of political labels."

* * * *

"I am inclined to agree with b. in principle. However, in practice I'm not too sure we can set ourselves up as arbiters of morality and fix a dividing line between those with whom we will deal and those with whom we will not deal, based on their 'morality'."

* * * *

"Both a. and b. are excellent statements. Further, if we really want to lead the world out of the present 'mess', we must be willing to make some economic sacrifices to that end, as for example by substantially easing trade restrictions with this country."

* * * *

"I don't believe there is any such thing as honor and morality in international relations. Self-interest and power are the factors that count."

* * * *

"It seems to me that we must have more than the moral initiative. We must convince others, especially the Middle-East and non-communist Asia, that we are a people of good will. Much of our aid has been received with cynicism. We should always be willing to meet with the criminals, except in those cases where the offer to meet is merely a trick to influence world opinion. However, any deal or agreement should meet the highest moral standards."

* * * *

"Both a. and b. are fuzzily expressed thoughts. Between the two, I lean toward a. I don't think we should exchange concessions on our part for promises on the part of Communists. On the other hand, I don't think we should refuse to

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exchange real concessions for real concessions, as long as we don't sell innocent people down the road, if we have any chance of keeping them from being shipped down the road anyway. In the case of mainland China, I don't think we can save the people of China from the yoke of Communism and don't believe that recognizing the Red Chinese government would be selling the Chinese people down the road. On the other hand, I don't think we should enter into a deal which would confirm Russian domination of Poland and Czechoslovakia, even though there is no immediate way of rescuing their peoples from the Soviet grip.

"Generally, I think we must hold tight in the hope that, in the long run, the Soviet power center will disintegrate from within; continue to build up our own strength and that of our allies; continue ready to negotiate when the Russians are ready to negotiate and not merely to use conferences as propaganda sounding-boards; try to improve our relations with the uncommitted nations -- India, Indonesia, etc. -- not by trying to force them into our camp, however unwilling, but by demonstrably deserving their friendship; avoid excessive fear and the erosion of the very product we hope others will want -- freedom."

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